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Abstract 
The individual self comprise unique attributes, the relational self comprises partner-shared 
attributes, and the collective self comprises ingroup-shared attributes.  All selves are fundamental 
components of the self-concept, with each being important and meaningful to human experience 
and with each being associated with health benefits.  Are the selves, however, equally important 
and meaningful?  We review a program of research that tested four competing theoretical views 
suggesting that the motivational hub of human experience is (a) the individual self, (b) the 
relational self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual or cultural factors.  The 
research furnished support to the view that the individual self is the primary form of self-
definition.  We discuss alternative explanations and implications.  We end with the introduction 
of a theoretical model, the boomerang model, that has the potential to integrate the diverse 
literature on the topic. 
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Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self: 
Hierarchical Ordering of the Tripartite Self 
 The self-concept is not a singular, monolithic cognitive structure.  Instead, it comprises 
three fundamental components: the individual self, relational self, and collective self (Sedikides 
& Brewer, 2001).  This is to say that people pursue and achieve self-definition in terms of their 
personal, relational, or group characteristics.   Are the three selves equally indispensible to the 
individual?  Is one more primary than the others?  Does it all depend on context and culture?  
These are the issues we address in the present article. 
The Three Selves 
  The individual self highlights one’s unique side.  It consists of attributes (e.g., traits, goals 
and aspirations, experiences, interests, behaviors) that differentiate the person from others.  This 
self-representation is relatively independent of relational bonds or group memberships.  The 
relational self, on the other hand, highlights one’s interpersonal side.  It consists of attributes that 
are shared with close others (e.g., partners, friends, family members) and define roles within the 
relationship.  This self-representation reflects valued interpersonal attachments.  Finally, the 
collective self highlights one’s intergroup side.  It consists of attributes that are shared with 
ingroup members and differentiate the ingroup from outgroups.  This self-representation reflects 
membership in valued social groups. 
The three selves co-exist, such that persons can alternate between perceiving the self as a 
distinct individual, as a relational partner, or as an interchangeable group member (Sedikides & 
Brewer, 2001a,b).  In addition, each self is associated with psychological and physical health 
benefits, and each self is important and meaningful to human experience (Berkman, Leo-
Summers, & Horwitz, 1992; Correll & Park, 2005; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gable, Reis, Impett, & 
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Asher, 2004; Hardie, Kashima, & Pridemore, 2005; Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009; 
Hawkley, Browne, & Cacioppo, 2005; Myers & Diener, 1995; Sheldon & Filak, 2008; Taylor, 
Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003a,b; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996).  
However, the selves may not be equally important and meaningful.  The selves may have 
different motivational utility.  If so, which self is primary?  
Theoretical Views on Motivational Self-Primacy 
Individual-Self Primacy 
This view asserts the primacy of the individual self.  The core attributes of this self-
representation are positive and important, influence the processing of subsequent information, 
and are resistant to unfavorable feedback but welcoming of favorable feedback (Markus, 1977; 
Sedikides, 1993).  Indeed, persons are motivated to maintain or elevate their self-image and to 
protect against possible deflation of their self-image.  For example, persons regard themselves as 
better than the average other, claim credit for a dyadic or group success while displacing blame 
to others, derogate conveyors of unfavorable feedback, and, when they cannot negate such 
feedback, recall it poorly or devalue the feedback dimension (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Brown, 
1998; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Shepperd, Malone, & Sweeny, 2008).  In all, existing literature 
is consistent with the possibility that the motivational hub of the self-concept is the individual 
self. 
Relational-Self Primacy 
This view asserts the primacy of the relational self.  Persons manifest a paramount desire 
for formation of stable interpersonal attachments, enhance and protect their relationships, resist 
the termination of existing relationships, and feel psychological and physical pain when socially 
excluded (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Murray, 
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Holmes, & Griffin, 1996).  In addition, close relationships influence perceptions, affective 
reactions, and behaviors toward new acquaintances, as well as goal pursuit (Andersen & Chen, 
2002; Sedikides, Olsen, & Reis, 1993; Tice & Baumeister, 2001).  In all, the existing literature is 
consistent with the possibility that the motivational hub of the self-concept is the relational self. 
Collective-Self Primacy 
This view asserts the primacy of the collective self.  Persons are profoundly influenced 
by their social groups in terms of conformity and belief polarization (Asch, 1951; Myers & 
Lamm, 1976).  In addition, persons are motivated to elevate and protect a positive group image, 
as they manifest favorable perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors toward their ingroup members 
(Boldry & Gaertner, 2006; Brewer 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  Finally, the collective self may 
accord the optimal level of self-definition by simultaneously meeting competing needs for 
assimilation through intergroup comparisons and differentiation through intragroup comparisons, 
respectively (Brewer & Roccas, 2001).  In all, existing literatures is consistent with the 
possibility that the motivational hub of the self-concept is the collective self. 
Contextual Primacy 
This view asserts the primacy of the contextual self.  Neither the individual nor the 
relational or collective self is inherently primary.  Rather, the relative primacy of these selves 
depends on contextual factors the influence their accessibility.  Indeed, research on the working 
self-concept (Markus & Wurf, 1987), symbolic interactionism or role theory (Stryker & Statham, 
1985), and the kaleidoscopic self (Deaux & Perkins, 2001) demonstrates shifts in self-definition 
as a function of norm salience, role importance, or fleeting social circumstances, respectively.  In 
addition, research on self-categorization theory (Onorato & Turner, 2004; Turner, Oakes, 
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) suggests that self-definition fluctuates between the individual and 
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collective self as a function of contextual features, with the collective self becoming salient in 
intergroup contexts and the individual self becoming salient in intragroup contexts. In all, the 
literature is consistent with the possibility that the motivational hub of the self-concept is the self 
rendered momentarily accessible by the vagaries of the social context. 
Comparative Testing 
 All four theoretical views are plausible and all can boast selective evidence in their favor.  
But to avoid impasses familiar to philosophical debates, the literature needs to move forward 
through comparative testing (Platt, 1964).  Which of these four views best accounts for 
motivational primacy in self-definition?  We initiated a program of research to address this 
question. 
 As stated above, persons are motivated to enhance or protect all three selves.  We used 
this motivational tendency as a medium, a metaphorical microscope of sorts, in our attempts to 
test for motivational primacy.  In particular, we compared the relative functioning of the three 
selves in the face of threat (e.g., negative feedback) or flattery (e.g., favorable feedback) under 
the rationale that the self that serves as the motivational hub of human experience will react more 
strongly to events that either weaken or bolster its integrity.  The motivationally primary self is 
the self that more strongly avoids or rejects threat and more strongly approaches or endorses 
flattery. 
 We carried out multiple studies, each with its own methodological nuances, in an effort to 
meet methodological considerations for effective and diagnostic hypothesis testing.  We 
introduced various controls over variables that could compromise comparative testing.  For 
example, across studies, we implemented different procedures for controlling the accessibility of 
the selves, enacted various forms of threat or flattery, measured a variety of reactions to threat or 
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flattery, sampled an assortment of collective selves, and assessed the independent reaction of 
each self.  Below, we provide representative empirical examples. 
Relative Primacy of Individual Self, Collective Self, and Contextual Self 
 Self accessibility.  In our first study (Gaertner, Sedikides, Graetz, 1999, Experiment 1), 
we tested female students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH).  We 
ventured to activate both the individual and collective self (i.e., UNC women).  We activated the 
individual self by highlighting participants’ “unique background, personality traits, skills, 
abilities, and hobbies.”  We activated the collective self by stating that participants were “female 
and you share membership in the group UNC women.”  All participants, then, completed a fake 
personality test and received fabricated feedback that was either threatening (“moody”) or 
flattering (“emotionally expressive”).  Importantly, the feedback pertained either to the 
individual self (e.g., you are moody vs. emotionally expressive) or the collective self (e.g., UNC 
women – excluding you – are moody vs. emotionally expressive).  Subsequently, participants 
were offered the opportunity to define themselves in accordance with either their individual self 
(“I am a unique individual,” “My personality attributes are totally unique,” “My beliefs and 
values are totally unique”) or their collective self (“I am very similar to UNC women,” My 
personality attributes are quite similar to the attributes of UNC women,” “My beliefs and values 
are quite similar to the beliefs and values of UNC women”).  
Participants could buffer themselves from the threatening feedback by escaping (i.e., 
shifting away) from the threatened self.  According to the individual-self primacy view, 
threatening feedback to the individual self would be more impactful than threatening feedback to 
the collective self; hence, participants  would shift to the collective self to buffer a threat to the 
individual self.  According to the collective self-primacy view threatening feedback to the 
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collective self would be more impactful than threatening feedback to the individual self; hence, 
participants would shift to the individual self to buffer a threat to the collective self.  Finally, 
according to the contextual primacy view, when both selves are made accessible, threatening 
feedback to the individual self will be as impactful as for the collective self; hence, participants 
would be equally likely to shift to the collective self when the individual self is threatened, and to 
shift to the individual self when the collective self is threatened.  The results were consistent with 
the individual-self primacy view.  Participants more strongly deemphasized their uniqueness and 
increased identification with their ingroup when they received threatening feedback about the 
individual self. 
Ingroup identification.  These findings may be limited to low group identifiers.  Could it 
be that threatening feedback to the collective self is more impactful for high than low group 
identifiers (Branscombe & Wann, 1991; Spears, Doojse, & Ellemers, 1997; Voci, 2006)?   In a 
follow-up study (Gaertner et al., 1999, Experiment 2), we first assessed strength of identification 
with the group (UNC-CH).  Then, we asked participants to complete an ostensibly valid 
creativity test and provided them with bogus and threatening performance feedback about either 
the individual self (“you scored at the 31st percentile”) or the collective self  (“UNC-CH students 
– excluding you – scored at the 31st percentile.”)  Finally, we recorded participants’ feelings 
(e.g., sadness, anger).  
Participants would experience bad mood following the feedback and would manage their 
mood by strategically lowering the personal importance of creativity (i.e., feedback derogation; 
Wyer & Frey, 1983).  According to the individual-self primacy view, negative mood and 
feedback derogation would be worse following threat to the individual self than collective self 
regardless of strength of group identification.  According to the collective-self primacy view, 
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negative mood and feedback derogation would be worse following threat to the collective than 
individual self regardless of strength of group identification.  Finally, according to the contextual 
primacy view, mood and feedback derogation would depend on strength of group identification: 
low group identifiers would manifest an individual-self primacy pattern, whereas high identifiers 
would manifest a collective-self primacy pattern.  Again, the results were consistent with the 
individual-self primacy view. Regardless of strength of group identification, participants 
experienced a more negative mood and derogated the feedback to a greater degree (i.e., rated 
creativity as less important), when the threatening feedback pertained to the individual self. 
Idiographically important group.  Are the above results patterns obtained when 
participants choose their own group (idiographic selection) than when the researcher chooses it 
for them (nomothetic selection)?  In another study (O’Mara, Gaertner, & Wayment, 2007), we 
adopted an idiographic approach.  Some participants selected their own group—in fact, the most 
important group to which they belonged—and proceeded to describe it (collective-self 
condition).   Other participants described what makes them a unique person (individual-self 
condition).  Then, all participants read a story ostensibly written by a recent university graduate 
who faced difficulties finding employment and life fulfillment.   Finally, participants wrote a 
narrative stating what could cause either a member of their most important group (collective-self 
condition) or themselves (individual-self condition) to have a negative experience similar to the 
student’s.   The narratives were coded for the degree to which the negative events befell the 
targeted self.  
 Participants could engage in a strategic self-protection move (Sedikides & Green, 2000; 
Sedikides & Strube, 1997).  They could disincline from face future threat and thus write an off-
topic response.  They could bypass the potential threat of future negative events by disregarding 
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the request to describe how such negativity could occur.  According to the individual-self 
primacy view, future negative events would be more threatening for the individual than 
collective self; hence, participants would ignore future threat to the individual self.  According to 
the collective-self primacy view, future negative events would be more threatening for the 
collective than individual self; hence, participants would ignore future threat to the collective 
self.  Finally, according to the contextual primacy view, negative future events would be equally 
threatening to the two selves; hence, participants would be equally likely to ignore future threat 
to either self.  The results were, once again, consistent with the individual-self primacy view.  
Most participants (93%) were willing to write about how a future negative event could befall 
another member of their group.  However, far fewer participants (60%) were willing to write 
about how the same future negative event could befall them personally. 
A meta-analysis.  We wondered whether the results generalized beyond the observed 
data to a population of possible studies that differed in procedural characteristics.  We also 
intended to expand the scope of our research by testing meta-analytically whether the selves 
respond differentially not only to threat but also to flattery.  Through literature searches, we 
arrived at a set of 37 studies that varied in terms of the threat or flattery they used, the types of 
reactions they assessed, and the groups that represented the collective self.  To pay full justice to 
the collective self and contextual self views, we coded studies in reference to two contextual 
variables.   The first involved strength of group identification.  A group is a more accessible 
basis of the collective self for high than low identifiers.  The second variable involved whether 
the group on which the collective self was based was laboratory-formed or natural. Such groups 
differ in several ways (e.g., member commitment, member investment; Ostrom & Sedikides, 
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1992).  The result is that natural groups are a more readily accessible basis of collective self than 
laboratory-formed groups. 
 According to the individual-self primacy view, participants react more strongly to both 
threat and flattery of the individual than collective self.  According to the collective-self primacy 
view, participants react more strongly to both threat and flattery of the collective than individual 
self.  Finally, according to the contextual-primacy view, it all depends on group identification 
and type of group.  Low identifiers and studies using laboratory groups will manifest individual-
self primacy patterns, whereas high identifiers and studies using natural groups will manifest 
collective-self primacy patterns.  The results were consistent with the individual-self primacy 
view.  Participants responded more strongly when their individual than collective self was 
threatened or flattered.  These responses occurred for both low and high group identifiers, and 
for both laboratory and natural groups. 
 Summary.  We applied particular care in order to control or manipulate factors that 
could yield misleading conclusions.   In particular, we (a) integrated various aspects of threat 
such as varying its type (e.g., received vs. future), controlling the feedback dimension, and 
controlling feedback importance; (b) assessed a variety of reactions such as strategic self-
shifting, mood state, feedback derogation, anger, and (un)willingness to face a future threat; (c) 
used a variety of groups to represent the collective self such as groups that are ascribed (e.g., 
gender), achieved (e.g., university affiliation), and idiographically designated as most important; 
(d) threatened the selves independently and assessed their independent responses; and (e) 
recorded meta-analytically responses not only to threat but also to flattery.  The findings attested 
to the motivational primacy of the individual self versus the collective or contextual selves. 
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 These findings are consistent with relevant literature. Participants evaluate the individual 
self more positively than the ingroup (Lindeman, 1997), regard the individual self more capable 
than the ingroup of resisting media propaganda (Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1995), and take personal 
responsibility for the successes of the ingroup while blaming it for its failures (Mullen & 
Riordan, 1988). Participants accentuate intragroup differences more than they accentuate 
intragroup similarities (Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995), a pattern that attests to 
individual self’s strivings for uniqueness.  Group members disengage from successful ingroups 
when intragroup comparisons threaten the individual self (Seta & Seta, 1996), whereas 
employees decide on staying or leaving their companies on the basis of personal gain (e.g., 
resources, satisfaction, promotion opportunities) rather than corporate identification (Rusbult, 
Farrell, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988).  Finally, persons allocate more resources (i.e., money) to the 
ingroup than the outgroup only when they are likely to maximize their own earnings via this 
ingroup favoritism (Gaertner & Insko, 2000). 
Relative Primacy of Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self, and Contextual 
(Cultural) Self 
The relational self.  Where does the relational self fit in the motivationally hierarchy?  
As the literature review that we presented in the first part of this article illustrates, the relational 
self has as much at stake in topping the motivational hierarchy as any other self (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996; Tice & Baumeister, 2001).  At the very least, the 
relational self may be more primary than the collective self.  We conducted three studies to 
address this issue (Gaertner et al., 2010). 
Goals.  Motivational primacy is manifested not only in reactions to feedback but also in 
proactive functioning such as the construction of goals and ideals (Carver & Scheier, 2002; 
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Elliott & Dweck, 1988).  Persons pursue goals pertinent to their individual, relational, and 
collective selves (Gore & Cross, 2006; Sheldon & Houser, 2001).  Such goals, when achieved, 
contribute to subjective well-being (Emmons, 1986; King, Richards, & Stemmerich, 1998) and, 
when thwarted, produce deeply unpleasant feeling states (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins, 
1987).  Even imagining successful goal completion elevates subjective well-being and improves 
physical health five months into the future (King, 2001).  In our motivational primacy research 
(Gaertner et al., 2010), we explored whether the selves are associated differentially with life 
goals.  
Culture (or context).  What is the role of culture in the motivational primacy debate?  
The cultural-self perspective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989), which is generally 
compatible with the contextual self approach, suggests that the cognitive, emotional, and 
motivational elements of the self-system are forged by culture, and in particular by internalized 
cultural norms.   Norms in Western culture (e.g., USA, Canada, Northern and Western Europe, 
Australia) underscore agency, uniqueness, and personal success, giving way to an independent 
(i.e., separate, individualistic) self-system.  However, norms in Eastern culture (e.g., East Asia, 
Latin America, India, Middle East) underscore communality, connectedness, and the importance 
of others, giving way to an interdependent (i.e., connected, collectivistic) self-system.  (For more 
nuanced perspectives, see: Dubois & Beauvois, 2005; Oyserman & Lee, 2008).   It follows that 
motivational primacy will fluctuate with culture.  According to the cultural-self perspective, the 
individual self will be on top of the hierarchy in the West but at the bottom of the hierarchy in 
the East.  Instead, the relational and collective selves will have primacy in the East. 
The findings, however, appear to favor a universalist-self perspective.  In self-description 
tasks, participants write a higher proportion of individual-self aspects than collective-self 
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aspects.  That pattern replicates across (a) participants both with an independent and 
interdependent self-construal (Gaertner et al., 1999, Investigation 4), (b) Chinese and American 
or Canadian participants (Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991), 
Philippino, Mexican, Australian, and American participants (del Prado et al., 2007), and (c) 
experimenter-activated priming of individual and collective self (Trafimow et al., 1991; Ybarra 
& Trafimow, 1998, Experiment 3).  Moreover, at the implicit level, participants from the US, 
China, and Japan evaluate the individual self more positively than the relational friend (i.e., best 
friend) or the collective self (i.e., ingroup member) (Yamaguchi et al., 2007).  We (Gaertner et 
al., 2010) proceeded to test more directly whether culture moderates motivational primacy. 
The evidence.  In Study 1, we used an idiographic paradigm that allowed participants to 
represent their relational and collective selves with whichever interpersonal relationship or social 
group they deemed appropriate.  We first rendered the three selves accessible by supplying 
participants with detailed definitions of each self.  Then, we assessed participants’ reactions to 
the imagined loss of the activated self (i.e., individual, relational, or collective): what the 
emotional impact of the loss would be, whether participants could be the same person following 
the loss, whether their life would be meaningless following the loss, and whether they would 
experience more intense negative or positive emotions as a results of the loss.  Finally, we 
assessed which self participants regarded their true or real self. 
Participants manifested stronger reactions (i.e., larger effect on life, less positive mood, 
more negative mood) to the imagined loss of the individual than the collective self (thus 
replicating conceptually our past research), and to the imagined loss of the relational than 
collective self.  Also, the majority of participants regarded as more true or real their individual 
than collective self, and their relational than collective self.  But how about the comparison 
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between the individual and the relational self?  Participants expected the loss of the individual 
self to impact more severely on their life than the loss of the relational self, and they also 
regarded as more true or real their individual self than collective self.  However, participants 
reported an equally intense mood at the loss of the individual and relational selves.  In all, the 
findings point preliminarily to a three-tiered motivational hierarchy among selves, with the 
individual self at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the relational self, and trailed by the 
collective self. 
In Study 2, we engaged in another test of the motivational hierarchy using different 
methodology.  First, we activated either the individual, relational, or collective self by supplying 
participants with relevant and detailed definitions.  Then, we assessed threat avoidance by 
examining whether participants complied with instructions to describe how negative events 
could befall that self (as in O’Mara et al., 2007).  Participants were more likely to avoid a threat 
to the individual self than either to the relational or the collective self.  However, participants 
exhibited only a weak tendency to avoid threat to the relational than collective self.  The findings 
were generally congruent with the three-tier motivational primacy model in which the individual 
self is at the top.  Yet, given the weakness of the relational-to-collective self comparison, and 
given our goal to find out if the findings are qualified by culture, we carried out another study 
involving a different methodology. 
Study 3 assessed the relative proactive capacity of each self.  Do the three selves 
contribute differentially to life goals?  The self-accessibility task came first.  Participants from 
China and the US described themselves in terms of one of the three selves.  Next, they listed 
their future goals, rated the importance of each goal, and indicated the self with which each goal 
was linked.  Our reasoning was that selves with higher motivational potential would play a more 
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pivotal role in the establishment of a desired future.  That is, the motivationally primary self 
would influence disproportionately future life goals, such that the primary self would be linked 
more frequently with goals and would be associated more strongly with important goals.  Study 3 
also intended to test whether motivational self-primacy is moderated by culture.  If the 
motivational hierarchy is a product of culture, then the individual self would be most primary in 
the US and least primary in China.  In the US, future goals would be linked more strongly with 
the individual than relational or collective selves, whereas in China future goals would be linked 
more strongly with the relational or collective selves than the individual self.  On the other hand, 
if the motivational primacy of the individual self is pancultural, then both cultures would 
manifest individual-self primacy. 
The results were consistent with the individual-self primacy view and the pancultural 
perspective.  Patterns of individual-self-primacy were remarkably consistent across cultures.  
Chinese and Americans attributed over twice as many goals to the individual self than the 
relational or collective selves.  Both Chinese and American participants regarded the most 
important goal associated with the individual self as more important than the most important goal 
associated with the relational or collective selves.  In addition, the weight of the evidence points 
to the higher motivational potential of the relational than collective self.  Participants attributed 
more of their future goals to their relational than collective self, with the exception of American 
males who attributed goals equally to those selves.  Nonetheless, females and males of both 
cultures regarded the most important goal linked with the relational self to be more important 
than the most important goal linked with the collective self. 
Summary.  When it came to expected emotional impact of loss of each self, as well as 
the number and importance of goals ascribed to each self, the individual self came on top, 
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followed rather narrowly by the relational, which was followed distantly by the collective self. In 
addition, this pattern emerged cross-culturally.  The proximity of the individual and relational 
selves is, perhaps, not surprising, as the two develop in tandem and influence each other greatly 
(Cassidy & Shaver, 2008; Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008; Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005; 
Vohs & Finke, 2004).  Likewise, evidence suggests that, when the stakes (in terms of esteem or 
emotion) are high, the individual self tends to take precedence over the relational self.  In 
prosocial exchanges between close relationships, the give focuses on the costs of the prosocial 
act, whereas the receive focuses on the benefits she or he obtains (Zhang & Epley, 2009).  
Persons are more intolerant of personal disequilibrium (i.e., the thwarting of personal goal 
pursuits, growth, or exploration) than relational disequilibrium (i.e., the thwarting of a relational 
partner’s goal pursuits, personal, or exploration); alternatively, they are more keen to modify 
relational than personal dedication (Kumashiro, Rusbult, & Finkel, 2008).  Finally, when one 
perceives the superior performance of a close other as threatening, one distances the self from 
(i.e., one perceived the self as more dissimilar than) the close other in a strategic attempt to 
alleviate the threat (O’Mahen, Beach, & Tesser, 2000; Tesser, 1988). 
Consideration of Alternatives 
Our research suggests that the individual self is at the motivational core of the self-
system.  Our research also suggests that the collective self, albeit important in its own sake, is at 
the bottom of the three-tier motivational self-hierarchy.  What are some alternative explanations 
for these findings? 
One such explanation is that the positioning of the collective self is the outcome of the 
specific social groups that we used to represent it.  However, our findings generalized across 
ascribed groups (e.g., gender; Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 1), achieved groups (e.g., university 
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affiliation; Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 2), context-dependent groups (e.g., laboratory-formed 
ones; Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 3), and idiographically generated most-important groups 
(O’Mara et al., 2007).  Thus, this alternative is rather questionable. 
There is another explanation.  Our findings are due to differential level of specificity of 
the individual and collective self.  Past research (Giladi & Klar, 2002; Klar, 2002; Klar & Giladi, 
1997) has shown that singular referents (e.g., a specific group member) are evaluated more 
extremely than generalized referents (e.g., the group as a whole).  In our research, we 
operationalized the individual self as a singular referent and the collective self as a generalized 
referent.  However, this alternative cannot explain why we obtained the same results pattern 
when we operationalized the collective self as a singular referent, that is, in terms of pondering 
how negative events might befall a member of the ingroup (O’Mara et al., 2007).  In addition, 
the singular versus generalized referent account is valid only when the two referents are 
evaluated in direct comparison with one another (Giladi & Klar, 2002; Klar, 2002; Klar & 
Giladi, 1997).  Most of our studies, however, used between-subjects designs, in which 
participants experienced threat or flattery of one self but not of another.  Thus, the two referents 
were not directly compared. 
Yet another alternative evokes a social impact theory (Latane, 1981) explanation.  Our 
findings may be due to a reduced impact of threat or flattery on the collective self, given that this 
impact was distributed and diffused across multiple ingroup members.  However, we obtained 
the same findings for single ingroup members (O’Mara et al., 2007), small and face-to-face 
three-person groups (Gaertner et al., 1999, Study3), and very large and anonymous groups 
(Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 1). 
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A final alternative challenges the universality of our findings and confines it to Western 
culture.  After all, Western culture prescribes norms of independence and uniqueness, whereas 
Eastern culture prescribes norms of interdependence and connectedness.  This alternative 
anticipates the individual self to be primary in the West but tertiary in the East.  However, the 
empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that the individual self has a strong presence in the 
East (Brown, in press; Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 
2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005; Yamaguchi et al., 2007).  Both in the West and the 
East participants give preponderance to the individual self in their self-descriptions (del Prado et 
al., 2007; Gaertner et al., 1999, Study 4; Trafimow et al., 1991).  In our research (Gaertner et al., 
2010, Study 3), we found that both Chinese and American participants valued the individual self 
more than the relational or collective self.   
A Theoretical Model 
 As stated in the introduction of this article, all three selves are vital to the identity of the 
person, all three selves are resourceful, and all are linked with psychological and physical health 
benefits.  In addition, there is evidence that the balance of concerns (e.g., goal pursuit, growth, 
exploration) associated with the individual and relational self (Kumashiro et al., 2008) is crucial 
for wellness, as is the balanced satisfaction of individual, relational, and collective self needs 
(Prilleltensky & Prilleltensky, 2007).  The question, though, is how exactly this balance among 
the selves is achieved. 
 We wish to sow the seeds of a theoretical model, the boomerang model, that addresses 
this question.  The model begins by postulating that the individual self is the experiential home 
base.  That is, the individual self is both the emotional and the motivational center of the person 
(Andersen, Glassman, & Gold, 1998; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1995; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008).  
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This relative stable (Bem & Allen, 1974) and self-preserving (Greenwald, 1980) home base 
constitutes the essence of the person. 
 According to the second postulate of the boomerang model, relational partners (Aron, 
Aron, & Smollan, 1992) or groups (Smith & Henry, 1996) become relevant to the person only 
when they are incorporated into the individual self.  Relationships and groups gain in personal 
value to the extent that they become psychologically glued to the individual self.  Psychological 
reduction of close others or groups into the individual self is achieved through expansion (Aron 
et al., 1992) or attachment (Cassidy & Shaver, 2008) processes.  
 The third postulate of the boomerang model is that the person uses this home base as a 
springboard for social exploration.  The person relies on the individual self as she or he engages 
in psychological excursions to the social world, that is to relationships and groups.  Stated 
otherwise, the person deserts the individual self for the purpose of relational or group activities.  
The frequency and duration of these desertions depend on how functional relationships or groups 
are for one’s personal concerns.  Such functions include the provision of intimacy, social 
support, reduction of uncertainty, self-esteem elevation, or practical (e.g., monetary) benefits. 
 The fourth and final postulate of the boomerang model assumes that the person may 
indeed develop strong relational or group ties even to the point of experiencing a fusion between 
the individual self and the other selves (Aron et al., 1992; Hogg, 2007; Swann, Gomez, Seyle, 
Morales, & Huici, 2009).  Yet, the person, while oscillating often between the individual self and 
either the relational or collective self, will always return to the home base: the individual self.  
The person will boomerang back to the individual self for refuelling in her or his explorative 
forays into the social world. 
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 Arguably, the boomerang model summarizes satisfactorily a good chunk of data on the 
three selves.  Yet, the model will need to be tested directly.  In particular need of empirical 
verification is the idea of consistent and persistent boomeranging of the relational or collective 
selves back to the individual self. 
Concluding Remarks 
 The individual, relational, and collective selves are both basic forms of self-definition 
that contribute crucially to human experience.  However, the contribution of the three forms of 
self is not equivalent.  The motivational structure of the self-concept is arrayed hierarchically and 
the individual self has a motivational status elevated above that of the relational and (especially) 
collective self.  Metaphorically speaking, screams are most distressed and smiles are most 
euphoric in response to events that involve the individual self.  Our findings have implications 
for theory-building.  The findings suggest that theories on the link between self and social 
perception will do well to base their premises and hypotheses predominantly on the individual 
self.  This type of self, it appears, sits closer to the motivational core of being human.  
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